Go Lean…Caribbean

Go Lean Commentary

The Caribbean has societal problems: our economics, security and governing engines are all defective. How do we fix these?

The book Go Lean…Caribbean prescribes a detailed, complex plan for effecting change in our society. The goal is to confederate under a unified entity made up of the region’s stakeholders to empower the economics and optimize Homeland Security. But Homeland Security for the Caribbean has a different meaning than for our North American or European counterparts. Though we too must be on defense against military intrusions like terrorism & piracy, we mostly have to contend with threats that may imperil the region’s economic engines, like our tourism products. This includes concerns like narco-terrorism and enterprise corruption, plus natural and man-made disasters like hurricanes, earthquakes, oil/chemical spills, etc..

So the Go Lean security goal is mostly for public safety! This goal is detailed in the book as it serves as a roadmap for the introduction of the technocratic Caribbean Union Trade Federation (CU). While the CU is set to optimize Caribbean society through economic empowerment, we must accept the established truth that the security dynamics of the region are inextricably linked to economic endeavors. Therefore the Go Lean roadmap has these 3 prime directives:

• Optimization of the economic engines in order to grow the regional economy to $800 Billion & create 2.2 million new jobs.
• Establishment of a security apparatus to ensure public safety and protect the resultant economic engines.
• Improve Caribbean governance to support these engines.

All in all, the quest of these prime directives involves heavy-lifting.

Anything described as heavy-lifting requires a full measure of devotion and commitment; it requires time, talent and treasuries. But just how much time? How much talent? How much of our treasuries?

These are all good questions and the consensus is that the answer is all qualitative and subjective, except for the last one: how much money to spend on security initiatives can be quantitative. There are existing formulas for this determination, that are universally accepted. The formula comes from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has been presented in the Go Lean book as the example/role-model for the Caribbean to emulate. NATO was formed in 1949 as a collective response to security threats in the European region; member-states came together and confederated this inter-governmental security force to enjoy economies-of-scale of “many hands making a big job a smaller effort collectively”. See the relevant Appendix VIDEO below.

(The subject of NATO is en vogue right now as the new US President – Donald Trump – has voiced reservations about the other member-states (the US is 1 of 28) paying their “fair” share of NATO’s expenses. He had falsely related that the US was supplying 73% of NATO funds.)

In the Caribbean, we have a similar quest – fostering a security apparatus for our own needs – as was Europe’s original plan. The Go Lean book asserts these CU security mandates for a unified region at Page 103:

10 Security Initiatives at Start-up
1. Lean-in for the Caribbean Single Market & Economy initiative: CU Trade Federation.
The CU treaty integrates 30 member-states in the Caribbean region into a single market of 42 million people so as to reboot the economic engines of the region. The CU posits that whenever there is economic prosperity that “bad actors” would emerge to exploit the peace for their own illicit gains. This was the case with the Pirates of the Caribbean in the 17th & 18th centuries, and the Gold Rush / Outlaws of 19th century Old West. So at the outset, the CU must tie a security apparatus to its economic rebooting activities. There is a need to assuage current threats and abate crime, so the Trade Federation must implement security/defense initiatives and enhance law-and-order institutions to better “serve and protect” the region.

• The Bottom Line on NATO
  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an inter-governmental military alliance based on the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed on 4 April 1949. The organization constitutes a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. For its first few years, NATO was not much more than a political association. However, the Korean War galvanized the member states, and an integrated military structure was built up, [and remains to this day]. During the Cold War, NATO was intended to be a credible defense against a Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. Starting with 11 member-states, there are 28 today.

2. Unified Command & Control with State Militias and Police

3. Intelligence Agencies Collaboration

4. Border Security – Immigration / Emigration Tracking; Data Capture & Big Data Analysis

5. Satellite Surveillance Contracts

6. Closed Circuit Camera Installations

7. US Aid – Air Support

8. UK/Dutch Aid – Naval Ships

9. Recruitment & Repatriation of Diaspora

10.  Israeli Defense Force Modeling

The ‘T’ in the acronym for NATO means Treaty. A ratified treaty is the premise of this alliance between European and North American countries. It is also the premise for the Security Pact for the Caribbean, in which we have CU military forces and the host countries. The treaty is considered a Status of Forces Agreement; an agreement between a host country and a “foreign” stationing military force in that country. SOFA’s are often included, along with other types of military agreements, as part of a comprehensive security arrangement. The SOFA does not constitute the actual security arrangement, it establishes the rights and privileges of foreign personnel present in a host country in support of the larger security arrangement.

The book Go Lean…Caribbean posits that the region must prepare its own security apparatus – a NATO-styled inter-governmental military alliance – for our own security arrangement, to execute a limited scope on their sovereign territories. The limited scope reflects the separation-of-powers between the member-state governments and the CU Homeland Security agencies. So the request is that all Caribbean member-states welcome this foreign military force – foreign as in from the neighboring countries, from the confederated authority.

Some CU Homeland Security activities include:

• A Naval Authority for the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for the Caribbean Sea
• A robust Intelligence Gathering and Analysis apparatus
• A Group Purchasing Organization, for armament procurement

The book contends that this confederated authority is the best way to prepare for the bad actors that will emerge just as a result of new economic successes in our region. This point is pronounced early in the book with the Declaration of Interdependence (Page 12) that claims:

x.   Whereas we are surrounded and allied to nations of larger proportions in land mass, populations, and treasuries, elements in their societies may have ill-intent in their pursuits, at the expense of the safety and security of our citizens. We must therefore appoint “new guards” to ensure our public safety and threats against our society, both domestic and foreign. The Federation must employ the latest advances and best practices … to assuage continuous threats against public safety.

xvi. Whereas security of our homeland is inextricably linked to prosperity of the homeland, the economic and security interest of the region needs to be aligned under the same governance. Since economic crimes, including piracy and other forms of terrorism, can imperil the functioning of the wheels of commerce for all the citizenry, the accedence of this Federation must equip the security apparatus with the tools and techniques for predictive and proactive interdictions.

The Caribbean appointing “new guards”, or a security pact to ensure public safety is intended to be a comprehensive endeavor; the funding should follow the NATO model of 2-percent – see Appendix below – the US has the largest NATO economy so they pay a much larger share of the funding. This 2-percent approach would dictate the following budget (in $millions) for the Caribbean Security Pact; using 2010 GDP numbers from the Go Lean book Page 66:

Member-State	2010 GDP	2% Defense
Anguilla	0.108	$0.00
Antigua and Barbuda	1,646	$32.92
Aruba	2,400	$48.00
Bahamas	9,228	$184.56
Barbados	5,244	$104.88
Belize	2,525	$50.50
Bermuda	5,085	$101.70
British Virgin Islands	84	$1.68
Cayman Islands	1,939	$38.78
Cuba	111,000	$2,220.00
Dominica	720	$14.40
Dominican Republic	76,304	$1,526.08
Grenada	1,153	$23.06
Guadeloupe	6,169	$123.38
Guyana	3,082	$61.64
Haiti	11,562	$231.24
Jamaica	20,958	$419.16
Martinique	9,610	$192.20
Montserrat	29	$0.58
Netherlands Antilles	2,450	$49.00
Puerto Rico	67,870	$1,357.40
Saint Barthélemy	255	$5.10
Saint Kitts and Nevis	750	$15.00
Saint Lucia	1,839	$36.78
Saint Martin	599	$11.98
Saint Vincent	1,086	$21.72
Suriname	4,436	$88.72
Trinidad and Tobago	27,038	$540.76
Turks and Caicos Islands	845	$16.90
US Virgin Islands	2,679	$53.58
	$378,585.11	$7,571.70

$7.6 billion in spending to assure the regional defense? That would be nice!

The CU Trade Federation is designed to lead, fund and facilitate regional security forces. But the plan is NOT for the individual member-states to write checks to the CU. Rather, the CU Trade Federation creates its own funding – from regionalized services – and then encumbers the funds for each member-state to earmark the security initiatives, at the above rates. This is analogized as 2 Pies:

• One ‘pie’ to represent the existing budgets of the member-states and how they distribute their government funding between government services (education, healthcare, etc.), security measures (Police, Coast Guards)
• One ‘pie’ to represent the CU funding from exclusive activities (Spectrum Auctions, Lottery, Exploration Rights, Licenses, Foreign-Aid, etc.).

The concept of Foreign-Aid requires more than just a quick mention; this could be a significant source of CU security funding. We have the example-model of the US giving aid to Egypt; this is documented (circa November 2013) further in the Go Lean book on Page 103:

The Bottom Line on US Aid to Egypt
Annually, the U.S. funds 20% of Egypt’s military budget (US$1.3 billion) and gives another US$250 million in economic aid. The US is now being pressured to suspend aid to [the] Egyptian military because the military has overturned the vote of the people and executed a coup d’état; [this is a violation of US law to support such a regime]. US Senator John McCain asserts that once a timetable is arranged for a new election and a new constitution “we should evaluate whether to continue with aid or not.” He was the first US politician to refer to the events as a coup. But as of August 31, 2013, the US was still set to go ahead with the delivery of F-16 jets promised to Egypt.

The foregoing SOFA is “Step One, Day One” in the Go Lean roadmap for Homeland Security, covering the need for adequate funding, accountability and control. The Go Lean book details this along with a series of community ethos, strategies, tactics, implementations and advocacies to provide increased public safety & security in the Caribbean region:

Other subjects related to security and governing empowerments for the region have been blogged in previous Go Lean…Caribbean commentaries, as sampled here:

The movement behind the Go Lean roadmap wants to make the Caribbean homeland a better-safer place to live, work and play; this means optimizing the societal engines of economics, security and governance.

We do not have to wage a World War, only ensure protections for our people and trading partners. It is unfortunate, but true, that domestic and foreign “bad actors” will always emerge as societal threats. The Caribbean has this experience. So we do not want to play catch-up with our security needs, we want to proactively enable this security apparatus from Day One of this new Caribbean empowerment roadmap. As related: We must therefore appoint “new guards” to ensure our public safety …

Appointing is one thing; funding it is another, thusly the thorough Go Lean roadmap, detailing the required strategies and tactics to fund the  Security Pact. This roadmap is therefore conceivable, believable and achievable. All of the Caribbean are hereby urged to lean-in to this roadmap. 🙂

Download the book Go Lean … Caribbean – now!

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Appendix Title: Funding NATO
Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to the costs of running NATO and implementing its policies and activities.

Highlights

• Indirect – or national – contributions are the largest and come, for instance, when a member volunteers equipment or troops to a military operation and bears the costs of the decision to do so.
• Direct contributions are made to finance requirements of the Alliance that serve the interests of all 28 members – and are not the responsibility of any single member – such as NATO-wide air defence or command and control systems. Costs are borne collectively, often using the principle of common funding.
• Within the principle of common funding, all 28 members contribute according to an agreed cost-share formula, based on Gross National Income, which represents a small percentage of each member’s defence budget.
• Common funding arrangements are used to finance NATO’s principal budgets: the civil budget (NATO HQ running costs), the military budget (costs of the integrated Command Structure) and the NATO Security Investment Programme (military capabilities).
• Projects can also be jointly funded, which means that the participating countries can identify the requirements, the priorities and the funding arrangements, but NATO provides political and financial oversight. The funding process is overseen by the North Atlantic Council, managed by the Resource Policy and Planning Board, and implemented by the Budget Committee and the Investment Committee.
• In 2014, at the Wales Summit, NATO leaders tasked further work in the areas of delivery of common funded capabilities, reform governance and transparency and accountability, especially in the management of NATO’s financial resources.

…
The 2% defence investment guideline

In 2006, NATO member countries agreed to commit a minimum of two per cent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to spending on defence. This guideline principally served as an indicator of a country’s political will to contribute to the Alliance’s common defence efforts. Additionally, the defence capacity of each member country has an important impact on the overall perception of the Alliance’s credibility as a politico-military organisation.

The combined wealth of the non-US Allies, measured in GDP, exceeds that of the United States. However, non-US Allies together spend less than half of what the United States spends on defence. This imbalance has been a constant, with variations, throughout the history of the Alliance and more so since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, after which the United States significantly increased its defence spending. The gap between defence spending in the United States compared to Canada and European members combined has therefore increased.

Today, the volume of the US defence expenditure effectively represents 72 per cent of the defence spending of the Alliance as a whole. This does not mean that the United States covers 72 per cent of the costs involved in the operational running of NATO as an organisation, including its headquarters in Brussels and its subordinate military commands, but it does mean that there is an over-reliance by the Alliance as a whole on the United States for the provision of essential capabilities, including for instance, in regard to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; air-to-air refuelling; ballistic missile defence; and airborne electronic warfare.

The effects of the financial crisis and the declining share of resources devoted to defence in many Allied countries have exacerbated this imbalance and also revealed growing asymmetries in capability among European Allies. France, Germany and the United Kingdom together represent more than 50 per cent of the non-US Allies defence spending, which creates another kind of over-reliance within Europe on a few capable European Allies. Furthermore, their defence spending is under increasing pressure, as is that of the United States, to meet deficit and indebtedness reduction targets. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO leaders agreed to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and decided:

• Allies currently meeting the 2% guideline on defence spending will aim to continue to do so;
• Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is below this level will halt any decline; aim to increase defence expenditure as GDP grows; and will move toward the 2% guideline within a decade.

While the 2% of GDP guideline alone is no guarantee that money will be spent in the most effective and efficient way to acquire and deploy modern capabilities, it remains, nonetheless, an important indicator of the political resolve of individual Allies to devote to defence a relatively small, but still significant, level of resources at a time of considerable international uncertainty and economic adversity.
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization – Official Website; posted January 19, 2017; retrieved 02/21/2017 from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm?

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Appendix VIDEO – NATO chief comments on Russia, defence funding in first official address – https://youtu.be/6Rf7gi81zPk

Published on Aug 3, 2015 – NATO’s new secretary-general said Tuesday that only a strong Western alliance can negotiate better ties with Russia.
Jens Stoltenberg said his experience as Norway’s prime minister was that robust defence capabilities and a strong trans-Atlantic bond were fundamental to bring about constructive relations with Russia.
In his first policy speech since taking office Oct. 1, Stoltenberg said there was no contradiction between wanting to keep NATO strong and continuing to attempt to engage with the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
“NATO is here to stay. Russia is here to stay. So we’re going to have some kind of relationship,” Stoltenberg said. The question, he said, is “what kind.”
Stoltenberg also spoke about the threats facing NATO in the south, where Islamic State group extremists have seized large parts of Iraq and Syria and declared a self-styled caliphate, or Islamic empire.
The group launched its offensive on the Syrian border town of Kobani and nearby villages in mid-September.
The fighting has killed more than 800 people, according to activists.
Kobani borders the Turkish town of Mursitpınar.
He said NATO had already deployed Patriot batteries to Turkey and had pushed ahead with a missile defence system.
“This sends a strong signal of solidarity and a strong signal of deterrence,” he said, adding “we must be prepared to use military force when necessary.”
Stoltenberg said defence budgets that were trimmed after the end of the Cold War needed to be replenished due new security threats.
“We are moving into more uncertain times, more uncertain security environment and therefore there are strong arguments of increasing defence spending again after a long period of reducing them.”
The NATO chief spoke in Brussels at an event organised by the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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